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TOWARD THE COMMUNITY OF 
TRUE INDIVIDUALS 
by David L. Norton 
For purposes of this paper, "community" shall be taken to mean a 
form of sociality in which persons appear to one another as persons. The 
relations of community are personal relations. 
By contrast, most social relations in our experience are abstract and 
impersonal, hence devoid of the definitive quality of community 
relations. So decisively is this the case that those lingering relations we 
suppose to be personal-romantic love, friendship, and family 
relations-have come to be regarded in compensatory fashion as one's 
refuge from the impersonality of social life on the whole. 
I will begin by arguing that the impersonality of social relations on 
the whole is neither an accident nor an ineluctable fate, but a sought-for 
outcome of human design. The foundation of this design was a certain 
conception of personhood that was radically deficient, as attested by the 
historical explication of its implications in which we find ourselves today. 
My constructive endeavor will be to explicate the social implications of 
an alternative conception of personhood. Insofar as labels can be help- 
ful, this conception can be termed eudaimonistic. Our thesis is that mis- 
conceived personhood has generated an abstract sociality attended by 
frustration, alienation, and anomie, and that the corrective lies in eudai- 
monistic reconception of personhood and the alternative kinds of 
sociality that such a reconception engenders. 
By wide agreement among socio-political historians, the dominant 
fact of political modernity is the so-called "rise of the individual." 
Together, Jacob Burckhardt, R.  H. Tawney, Max Weber, John Dewey, 
Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, and just now Quentin Skinner, discern 
the origin of political modernity in the endeavor to enfranchise the indi- 
vidual against the collective authorities of church and state. But it is 
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deeply ironic from the standpoint of the eudaimonistic individualism for 
which I wish to  speak that a concomitant of  this "rise of the individual" 
was a strategy for depersonalizing social relations in the name of ob- 
jectivity. The first step in this depersonalization was the doctrine that 
sociaIity itself, or  at any rate its paramount form of "civil association," 
is a non-natural artifact. This emphatic and reiterated doctrine is an  
expression of the realpolitik resolve to dismiss ideals in favor of brute 
facts, therewith rejecting "natural law" in its teleological meaning in the 
endeavor to be scientific. Accordingly the conception of artifice here 
employed is explicitly disjunctive: what is artifactual is non-natural.' In 
terms of ou r  thesis, what the doctrine means is that persons d o  not and 
cannot appear in the social relations of civil association, What appear 
instead are cives, which are the creations and embodiments of those arti- 
factual relations themselves. 
But depersonalization is as yet incomplete, and to show what came 
next I will make use of John Dewey's analysis of the transition from 
concrete to abstract as it appears in The Quest for Certainty. The first 
step, as Dewey presents it, is the substitution of "special symbols" for 
items of experience. In our sketch above, this is the step by which arti- 
factual relata are substituted for persons in artifactual sociality. But the 
second step appears with the recognition that the special symbols exhibit 
purely symbolic relations and generate problems among themselves, 
wholly independently of concrete problems in the relations and relata 
they were originally devised to  symbolize. In Dewey's words this 
produces the reframing of the symbols "in detachment from direct use 
and  with respect to one another."' 
In the depersonalization of social relations, what corresponds to the 
second step as identified by Dewey is bureaucracy as classically explicated 
by Max Weber. In Weber's study the process of bureaucratization is the 
rationalization, professionalization, centralization, and depersonalization 
of social relations, beginning with law and public administration. The 
images Weber uses to commend bureaucratization are revealing. H e  says 
for example that bureaucratized law and administration are "technically" 
superior to all prior forms, much as "machine production is superior to 
nonmechanical methods."' He approves the "modern judge [who] is a 
vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together with the 
fee and which then disgorges the judgment together with its reasons me- 
chanically derived from the code.""e refers to  bureaucracy as the 
"canonization of the abstractly i m p e r ~ o n a l . " ~  And he says that adminis- 
trative efficiency, "with its appropriateness for capitalism . . . [isJ the 
more fully realized the more bureaucracy 'depersonalizes' itself, i.e. the 
more  completely it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred, 
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and every purely personal, especially irrational and incalculable, feeling 
from the execution of  official tasks."" 
The key to Weber's endorsement o f  bureaucracy appears in the line, 
"every personal, especially irrational and incalculable feeling." This is 
likewise a key to the objectivizing motif in socio-political modernity a s  
first expressed in the doctrine of artifactual society. The personal is 
understood as the irrational and incalculable, and therefore social order 
to  be order must preclude it. T o  be sure, this understanding by itself 
does not distinguish political modernity, for it is likewise foundational 
for example in totalitarianism. As Santayana wrote, "The constant 
compensation tyranny brings, which keeps i t  from at once exhausting its 
victims, is the silence it imposes on their private squabbles."' It is the 
principle by which Mussolini got the trains of Italy running on  time. 
What distinguishes political modernity is the incorporation of deper- 
sonalized socia1 order with popular sovereignty under the banner of 
individualism, which we can characterize as the agreement by associates 
to  depersonalize themselves. A key feature here is the classical liberal 
innovation of the "private sector." Doctrinally, the private sector is a 
portion of the experience of persons in which they are exempt from 
public regulation. In one  light it appears as a trade-off and a com- 
pensation for the voluntary depersonalization of civil association, and the 
success of classical liberalism is attributable in large measure to the 
allure, the promise, in the private sector. Part  of this promise was the 
prospect of creating community in the form of small, voluntary, private 
associations. I will call this the Rotary Club theory of community, and it 
is the theory of community advocated by classical liberals today. But the 
private sector was vitiated from the start by two considerations. In the 
first place conduct within it was non-criteriological. It was the place for 
the expression of the personal, and the personal was regarded as the 
irrational and incalculable. In the shelter of the private sector the con- 
duct became that for which one was not to be held answerable. 
Therefore the private sector couId be used with impunity for idle self- 
indulgence o r  what-not. Because objective worth is by definition public, 
the disjunctive conception of the private sector as first of all not public 
amounts to the subjectivization of value in the private sector, which 
portends the demise of vaIue initiatives. If the sole support for what I 
deem worthy, right, or  good, is my own conviction, then only my easy 
moral enterprises will be sustained; arduous ones will undermine my 
conviction. 
T o  a large extent the second vitiating factor took advantage of this. 
Redlpolitik opted for a narrowly circumscribed conception of man, 
namely economic man understood as selfish, utilities-maximizing man. It 
built social order on this constricted conception, to  the exclusion o f ,  for  
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example, religious man, philosophica1 man, and moral man, relegating 
these latter to the private sector. It merely reinforced the predictability of 
economic man and encouraged persons to conceive of themselves uni- 
formly as such. As A. 0. Hirschman documents in his study, The 
Passions and the Interests,Vhe sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wit- 
nessed a striking reduction in the meanings of such terms as "interest," 
6 L enterprise," and "worth" to the narrow meanings they still bear today 
of economic interest, economic enterprise, and economic worth. (Our 
meaning of "private enterprise" is epitomized, for example, in the 
Polaroid Corporation; but is not birdwatching a "private enterprise"?) 
Historically, the predictable upshot was that the neophyte individual 
in his new-found haven of the private sector was wholly unprepared to 
muster the heroics of becoming the causa sui that Montaigne believed he 
would become, and Mill believed he should become. Rather, he merely 
took his economic self-conception with him into the private sector-so to 
speak "moonlighting," and depersonalizing the private sector in the 
process. He became just as predictable in private as in public, which is 
why for example the hedonistic calculus works to the degree that i t  does 
work. 
In sum, the vitiating factors in the private sector were corrosive of 
the personal, which civil association had excised. And i f  the net effect 
was only implicit in the beginnings of socio-political modernity, today it 
is explicit as the disappearance of the personal as a social factor; i.e., as 
a basis of association. But we began by identifying community as a form 
of association based upon the personal. In as sensitive a conception of 
community as the literature of our century offers, Martin Buber rests it 
upon the capacity for what he terms "personal making pre~ent ."~ Our 
historical excursus suggests that socio-political developments of the past 
four hundred years have served to extinguish the personal, which in com- 
munity is to be made present. 
What must be called into question in this socio-political history is 
the presupposition that the personal is the irrational and incalculable. 
The touchstone we will use is the concept of development. The personal 
may be undeveloped or developed. As undeveloped it is indeed irrational 
and incalculable, and with this fact Realpolitik is fully entitled to begin. 
In addition, it is true that the personal can be regimented by external 
control, but in this case it ceases to be personal, having become the 
objective product of  the controlling agency. But the personal can also 
become ordered without ceasing to be personal, namely as the outcome 
o f  the self-development that produces self-responsible, self-determined 
individuality. In this case the personal is by no means antagonistic to 
social order; on the contrary, it is the foundation of an alternative kind 
of  social order. Today all recognition of this alternative has been lost, 
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thanks to modernity's non-developmental, merely numerical conception 
of individuality; an individuality consisting in the bare fact that two 
things remain unalterably two and not one. The needed developmental 
recognition is, however, voiced, for example by John Dewey, who says in 
Reconstr~rction in Philosophy, "Only in the physical sense of physical 
bodies that to the senses are separate is individuality an original datum. 
Individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought 
out."'" 
Attention needs to be directed to what Dewey refers to as the social 
sense of individuality. Modern political individualism grounded its 
doctrine of artifactual society in a conception of the individual as asocial 
as well as non-developmental-the doctrine of so-called "atomic" in- 
dividuality of numerical particulars, separated by spaces in which no 
mysterious "social ties" are empirically manifest. To be sure, atomicity 
has been overturned by the subsequent sociological recognition that 
because persons begin their lives as dependents they are, in Marx's term, 
"social products"" and intrinsically social as such. Here is the secure 
starting point. But what has been left undone is exploration of the 
implications of subsequent development. As a historicist Marx himself 
was a developmentalist, but in a one-sided sense: he was concerned 
almost exclusively with history, understood as the collective self- 
development of the human species. The emphasis upon collective 
development to the neglect of the development of individuals is 
responsible for serious aberrations, not only in Marx but in the 
sociologicaI perspective as a whole, but I cannot undertake to identify 
these here. 
The eudaimonistic thesis is that persons are intrinsically social 
creatures in the beginning of their lives and also in the end, but the two 
socialities are emphatically not the same. The sociality of the beginning is 
the sociality of essential dependents; i.e., of children and of persons who 
developmentally remain children in later life. By the sociality of the end I 
refer to the sociality of persons who have become self-determined in- 
dividuals through processes of self-development. Such self-development 
may be quite rare. This was the reason given by Hobbes for declaring it 
politically irrelevant.12 But Hobbes misconceived i t  as a talent sparsely 
distributed by the natural lottery of birth. It is not this. It is a poten- 
tiality possessed by all persons, but rarely actuaIized, and the reason for 
the rarity is not far to seek. Self-actualization has necessary precon- 
ditions, some of which cannot be self-provided by individuals and must 
be otherwise provided. Realpolitik insured the absence of these con- 
ditions by its non-deveIopmentaI conception of individuality. The task of 
implementing the alternative kind of sociality, which is the sociality of 
true individuals, is the task, first, of discerning the necessary conditions 
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o f  individual self-development and distinguishing among them those that 
can be self-provided by persons and those that cannor be self-provided. 
The second step in implementation consists in providing to all persons 
those conditions that persons cannot self-supply; such is a social 
responsibility and the supreme criterion of good government. Hobbes 
spoke for modern political theory as a whole when he declared self- 
regulating individuality politically irrelevant by virtue of its rarity. What 
will overturn this verdict is a plausible program by which to secure the 
generalization of self-regulating individuality, and plausibility is within 
our reach today thanks to recently acquired knowledge of personal 
development and its conditions. T o  be sure, generalization ultimately 
depends upon the initiative of  persons as individuals and hence upon the 
attractiveness of self-development. The attractiveness consists in the 
intrinsic rewards of self-fulfullment, which, as Aristotle says, are such 
that they will be exchanged for no other by persons who are acquainted 
with them.I3 
Where development occurs there are two fundamental and in- 
commensurable forms of sociality to be considered, corresponding to the 
intrinsic sociality of the person at two different and incommensurable 
stages in his life. I will follow my practice elsewhere" of terming the two 
forms "antecedent sociality" and "consequent sociality." Antecedent 
sociality is the sociality into which we are born: it is involuntary; its 
associates are essential dependents; and its principle is the "at bottom" 
uniformity of associates consisting in the generic human nature that they 
instantiate identically. Consequent sociality is the outcome of  self- 
development by those persons whom it associates: it is voluntary; the 
associates are not dependents but autonomous individuals; and its 
principle is not uniformity but the complementarity of perfected dif- 
ferences. 
Antecedent sociality will not be analyzed or  argued for here, for this 
work has been done by sociology and contributory disciplines. Indeed, it 
has been overdone to the extent that many persons today are incapable 
of envisaging any other form of sociality than the sociality of depen- 
dence, in which case socioIogical determinism wins out by default. In this 
climate and infected by the same incapacity, moral individualism has 
sometimes truculently paraded itself as anti-social, witness romanticism's 
glorification o f  solitude as epitomized in Schopenhauer's insistence that 
the onIy company he ever found worth keeping was his own. In light of 
this, what must be done is first t o  exhibit the intrinsic sociality of true 
individuality, and second to  picture the form of sociality that true in- 
dividuality entails. 
Eudaimonistically conceived, self-development is self-actualization, 
i.e., the discovery and progressive actualization of potentialities within 
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the self. This is the process by which value appears in the world. The 
worth manifested by the self-actualizing individual is objective worth. T o  
say this means that it is of worth by no means only, or  even primarily, t o  
the self-actualizing individual. As objective it is of worth in principle to 
all other persons, and in fact to those persons who in themselves fulfill 
the conditions of  appreciation of worth o f  the distinctive kind manifested 
by the individual in question. One of these conditions, of course, is 
acquaintance, for one cannot appreciate something without knowledge of 
its existence. But some of the conditions are developmental: for example, 
to appreciate Stravinsky's Petrolrshka requires cultivated capacities in the 
listener, beginning with the cultivated capacity for sustained attention. 
Because self-actualization aims at  objectively worthy living, i t  is 
intrinsically social. Objective worth implies worth for others as well as 
oneself, and self-actualization is incomplete without realization of this 
valuation by, not to be sure all others, but some others. The romantic 
glorification of solitude is a reaction-formation. Doubtless it can and has 
happened that assiduously self-developed individuals have found no one 
with the cultivated capacities to appreciate the distinctive worth in their 
persons or their cultural contributions. This, in our thesis, constitiites 
genuine injustice. But the temptation in this situation to declare oneself 
sufficient unto oneself must be resisted, for it is suicidal, if not t o  the 
individual, then to individualism. There will be a few heroic spirits who 
can thus sustain themselves, but they will be so few as to  confirm the 
Hobbesian verdict of political irrelevance. And in my judgment such of 
these heroic spirits as have existed, have with few exceptions been 
contaminated by the powerful corrosive of resentment, and thereafter 
teach the wrong things. 
If appreciation by some others is a condition of self-fulfillment, and 
if such appreciation presupposes cultivated capacities in those others, 
then this is a condition of self-fulfillment that cannot be self-provided by 
individuals. Our thesis is that it is a social responsibility to  secure suf- 
ficient generalization of self-actualization that each true individual has a 
reasonable expectation of appreciation of his worth by some others. Here 
is our  paramount criterion of good government. 
I t  must be emphasized that "appreciation" in the paragraphs above 
implies utilization, and a corollary to our thesis is that utilization of 
others is not per se exploitative. Specifically, when our utilization of 
another follows from the other's autonomous self-actualization, not only 
is it not exploitative, but it represents an indispensable condition of  the 
other's self-fulfillment. Kant's imperative about treating other persons 
always a s  ends in themselves does not, despite frequent misrepresentation, 
preclude our treatment of them as means; it is carefully framed by Kant to 
preclude our treatment of them as means merely. 
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A collateral argument for the intrinsic sociality of true individuals 
consists in the interdependence of true individuals that derives from 
natural division of labor as the expression of qualitative individuality. T o  
be a qualitative individual in the normative eudaimonistic sense is to be 
responsible for actualizing a distinctive kind of human value that requires 
supplementation by other and different kinds of human value. It is not 
to  be responsible for actualizing in oneself all human possibilities. 
Because individuality reflects the Spinozan principle, omnis determinatio 
esf negatio, it is opposed to what Durkheim called the "malady of in- 
finite aspiration."'* The romantic conception of fulfilled individuality as 
perfect self-sufficiency is, once again, a reactive phenomenon and a false 
ideal. As social beings we are dependent upon others to do what they are 
responsible for doing, and very often they prove unreliable at this. 
Where the effect upon us of others' defaults is severe and frequent, it 
understandably generates in us a vision of complete self-sufficiency as a 
bulwark against further frustration. As a n  occasional compensatory 
fantasy and recognized self-indulgence there is perhaps little harm in it. 
But as a working ideal it is vicious, for it thwarts our own self- 
fulfillmene, for example, by suppressing the generosity that is native to  
i t .  What our frustration by the defaults of others must turn us to instead 
is an investigation of the conditions under which persons, ourselves 
included, become reliable at doing what they are responsible for doing. 
There appear to be  three separate sets of such conditions. One set 
consists of judicially imposed punishments for default. A second consists 
of the administration of extrinsic rewards for performance of respon- 
sibilities. These two sets are combined in our  familiar sociality, and serve 
to identify it as dependent sociality. But there is a third set of conditions 
under which persons become reliable at doing what they are responsible 
for doing, a set that has been neglected in modernity and that is to be 
identified with what I have been terming consequent sociality. It centers 
in the intrinsic rewards of living responsibly when one's responsibilities 
are self-determined and self-fulfilling. If ,  as eudaimonism postulates, 
there is fo r  every person a meaningful work with which he or she will 
identify and which he or  she will invest with moral necessity, then this 
third set of conditions is filled out by discovering the conditions under 
which all persons can discover themselves in terms of their meaningful 
work. Such work will be divided according to  the innate inclinations and 
disinclinations of persons themselves, constituting a natural division of 
labor. For "individuality" in this context means that among the 
countless different kinds of productive activity that a diversified society 
incorporates, each person will experience intrinsic rewards at only an 
interrelated few, while being indifferent or  disinclined to many. 
The reason that division of labor per se has been falsely conceived to 
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be alienating is that division of labor as we have known it has been 
externally imposed, in disregard of the inclinations and disinclinations of  
persons as individuals. The way to  individual fulfillment and self- 
responsibility is not by abolishing division of labor, but by generating 
division of labor from the innate inclinations and disinclinations o f  
persons as individuals. In effect this amounts to an inversion of the 
priority of social utilities over productive performances. It means giving 
priority to meaningful work, and generating social utilities therefrom. 
This is, in fact, the natural order. Both logically and temporally, work is 
first expressive and  thereafter useful, for knowledge of the utilities of  a 
performance is empirical, and presupposes the performance. The ap- 
parent priority of social utilities is an  aberration produced by the fact 
that history is the product of successive generations. Originally an ex- 
pressive performance by a given person or  group is discovered to possess 
soc~a l  utilities. Those who benefit from these utilities come to  depend 
upon them and expect them, and when the original providers of the 
utilities die, the sociaIized expectation is directed upon their successors, 
who at  this point exist as dependents and are unable to resist. In this way 
division of labor becomes objectivized in the abstract sense, and demands 
the self-alienation of persons through their adoption of roles, and 
participation in the abstract relations of roles and practices. Beneath this 
lies hidden the implicit sociality of true individuals, which is nowhere 
explicit and manifest because the self-development by persons of their 
individuality does not occur. It will of course be invisible to  the  
realpolitik resolve to recognize only existing facts. 
By virtue of the interdependence of true individuals, as just argued, 
eudaimonism must reject any meaning o f  "autonomy" that precludes 
interdependence, In the eudaimonistic meaning each person is an innate 
excellence to  be actiiaIized, and thus an  end in himself. By self- 
actualization he affords utilities to others; and he determines for himself 
what utilities he will derive from the self-fulfilling performances of 
others. Here is the interdependence of  autonomous individuals that 
represents the sociality here termed "consequent." Indeed, what con- 
sequent sociality is consequent upon is precisely this autonomy, un- 
derstood as a developmental outcome from dependence in the growth of 
the individual. And "antecedent" sociality is the sociality of persons who 
lack autonomy and are thereby dependent upon external authority. It 
should be noted that development furnishes the criterion of this external 
authority. Because the dependence in question is provisional dependence, 
the authority is required to  be provisional authority. The authority is 
legitimate when its exercise serves progressively to diminish the depen- 
dence of its subjects, and illegitimate when its exercise serves to  per- 
petuate or  increase their dependence. 
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We have carried our demonstration of the intrinsic sociality of true 
individuals as far as space allows, but before I undertake to describe that 
sociality, let me call attention to a distinguishing feature o f  the 
eudaimonistic thesis as a whole. It is that the virtues of community, as 
personal sociality, are to be found not behind us, in a pre-individuated 
sociality that is to be recovered by undoing modernity and the "rise of  
the individual"; rather they are to be gained by rescuing individuality 
from modern misconceptions, and forwarding it. 
Turning to the task of describing consequent sociality, I will begin 
not with an  abstract schematization of it as a whole, but with a concrete 
description of an important and suggestive element of it. The element I have 
in mind is the virtue of generosity. What requires to be shown is that this 
virtue is none of three things it has regularly been mistaken to be, but is 
something else entirely. It is not a talent distributed to  some and denied to 
others by the natural lottery of birth. It is not a socializing or  moralizing 
"side constraint" on natively acquisitive conduct. And it is not a portable 
attribute, Iearned independently and thereafter attached to  selected 
behaviors. Rather, it is a natural expression of self-actualizing individuality. 
There is a deep and ineradicable strand of generosity in meaningful work, 
and it is expressed in two ways. In the first pIace, meaningful work is self- 
actualizing work, and self-actualization is the objectivization of the self, 
which is to be understood as the gift of the best that one is to others. But 
"objective" as it appears here is to be strictly distinguished from the 
meaning of the term as it has shaped modernity, notably in the objective 
social structures endorsed by sociology. In their predominant modern 
usage, "objectivity" and  "subjectivity" bear mutually exclusive meanings, 
and endorsement of the objective has been accompanied by active 
disparagement of the "merely subjective." But this is an  abstractionist 
fallacy. There is nothing that is "merely subjective." Every human impulse 
is subjective in its inception but objective in its intended outcome, and 
because its outcome is within it implicitly in the beginning, it is never 
"merely subjective." 
When objectivization is understood as the expression of subjective 
selfhood in objective and public form, then the generosity inherent in 
self-actualization becomes apparent. Self-actualization expresses the 
intention to live a worthy life, which, as objectively worthy, is o f  worth 
to whoever is capable of appreciating it as such. It is in this sense a gift 
that by its own nature selects its recipients, and it is intended as such by 
the self-actualizing individt~al. The gift comprises, distinguishably but 
inseparably, the distributable products of the enterprise of self- 
actualization, and that non-distributable product that is the self- 
actualizing individual himself. If this is correct, then the corollary of the 
labor theory of value, that the products of labor are by nature the ex- 
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clusive property of the laborer, is a grievous error. It derives from the 
error of  conceiving o f  persons atomisticaily, as exclusive of one another, 
and we have confuted atomism by our  arguments for the intrinsic 
sociality o f  personhood both in the beginning and in the end. But 
atomism does not afford a sufficient account of the error of regarding 
the products of labor as the private property of the laborer in the ex- 
clusive sense. T o  achieve sufficiency we must take into consideration 
theft, which not only thwarts generosity, but can turn i t  into the reac- 
tion-formation of possessiveness and hoarding. 
Theft has many forms, and whatever our newspapers may shout, it 
is not embezzlement or purse-snatching that lays first claim upon our 
attention. What ubiquitizes theft under the aegis of law is the egalitarian 
supposition that at  bottom all persons are alike, and that everyone is by 
nature equally entitled to everything. This doctrine effectively thwarts the 
intrinsic generosity in self-actualization, for in giving oneself, one 
distinguishes one's recipients by virtue of the qualitative distinction of 
the gift. The gift is tneant for those who can appreciate and utilize the 
qualitatively distinctive values embodied in i t  by the expressive labors of 
its maker. 
I will recount a little story here. In a shop on the Royal Mile in 
Edinburgh is a Mr. Glenn, who is one of the two or  three premier 
bagpipe makers in Scotland. Mr. Glenn will not sell a set of his pipes to 
anyone who is not sufficiently skilled and sensitive to be able to utilize 
the qualities that distinguish Mr. Glenn's pipes from merely adequate 
sets. I know this because I tried to buy a set of pipes from Mr. Glenn. 
He  gave me two alternatives. H e  told me where I could purchase a lesser 
set of pipes. Or ,  he said, I could purchase a chanter from him and 
practice on  it for two years and then come back to see him. Though I 
did not ask, it was clear that I couId not purchase pipes from Mr. Glenn 
were I to offer twice the going price. No doubt in the context of our 
society Mr.  Glenn's is a privileged position. But the task of  discovering 
in consequent sociality the community of true individuals is the task of 
generalizing the very privilege Mr. Glenn enjoys-the privilege of caring. 
This brings us to the second form in which generosity appears as the  
expression of  self-actualization. I refer to  the appreciation by the in- 
dividual of the distinctive worth of other persons as individuals, whether 
that worth be actual or  merely potential and presumptive. This is the 
eudaimonistic meaning of respect for others. In operation it means 
entrusting to others the responsibility for actualizing vaIues each of them 
alone can actualize. Here I am not hesitant t o  employ a term emphasized 
by J .  S. but decidedly out of favor today. The  term is 
cLdeferen~e,"  and today it connotes obsequious self-effacement. But in fact 
deference to  the distinctive virtues of others is a n  entailment of self- 
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knowledge. For in the first place, self-knowledge is knowtedge of one's 
deficiencies as well as one's sufficiencies, thereby affording recognition of 
those who surpass us and from whom we can learn by example. And 
second, because the self is a qualitatively distinctive potentiality, self- 
knowledge includes knowledge of differentiae, and is therefore knowledge 
of alternative varieties of value, values to be actualized by other persons. In 
sum, to defer to others where their fundamental responsibilities and 
distinctive potential excellences lie is not self-effacement but the op- 
posite-it is a concomitant of self-actualization. 
This form of generosity, like the gift of oneself that self- 
objectivization represents, is a natural expression of developed in- 
dividuality. But there is more to be said about it, specifica1ly with respect 
to the egalitarian doctrine. To respect another is to acknowledge his 
responsibility for actualizing the distinctive potential value he is. But it is 
at the same time to affirm his entitlement to those goods which are 
conditions of his exercise of his responsibility. These goods will likewise 
be distinguished qualitatively. The other, because his responsibility is 
distinctive, is not entitled to a11 or any goods indiscriminately, but to the 
distinctive kinds of goods, in the limited amounts, he needs in order to 
fulfill his distinctive responsibility. Likewise we ourselves possess not 
indiscriminate entitlements but distinctive entitlements. As here ex- 
pressed, the generosity in true individuality is the affirmation of others' 
entitlements ro goods to which we ourselves possess no claim, and ad- 
vance none. On the other hand egalitarianism extinguishes this form of 
generosity by supplying mindless envy with spurious warrant. 
Let me now direct attention to the status of generosity as it has here 
been described. It is not an extraneously introduced side constraint, nor 
an artifact of civil association, but an expression of developed, in- 
dividuated personhood, and therefore i t  is what Buber calls a "personal 
making present." I have chosen generosity because i t  is the most ob- 
viously social of the traditional virtues. Our extended thesis is that what 
is true of generosity holds alike for the virtues of wisdom, courage, 
temperance, justice, honesty, wholeheartedness, fidelity, and resource- 
fulness. Alike, these virtues are natural expressions of developed in- 
dividuality. They constitute the terms of a social order that is implicit in 
personhood from the beginning, and that is progressively explicated by 
the development of personhood through self-actualization. This sociality 
is community in what we took to be its definitive sense at the outset, 
namely that persons are associated as persons, which we now understand 
to mean as self-responsible, self-determined individuals. 
Provided we are sufficiently on guard against the dangers of ab- 
stractionism, i t  can be useful here to distinguish form from content in 
consequent sociality. As with other kinds of sociality, there is here a 
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form that endures through the succession of generations of individuals. 
But this form is not a non-natural artifact; i t  is the expression of 
principles of association implicit in personhood itself. It  is therefore 
natural form, not however in the sense of primitive, but as the form 
achieved by cultivated development out of primitive potentialities in all 
persons. As such, this form presupposes other and different kinds of 
sociality prior to  itself, corresponding to prior stages in the development 
of persons. Eudaimonistic analysis reveals the indispensability of two 
prior forms of sociality. The first is the sociality of dependence, which 
requires external governance by trustworthy authority; the authority is 
trustworthy when its exercise serves progressively to diminish the 
dependence of its subjects. 
The next form of sociality is what Michael Oakeshott terms 
"collective enterprise association."" This is association on the basis of 
common purpose, and its mode of government is collective self- 
determination. Professor Oakeshott has decisively demonstrated that 
government as collective enterprise association is incommensurable with 
the self-government of individuals, where "individual" has the meaning 
he gives it in On Hurnan Conduct and I give i t  in this paper. But the 
point I would urge upon Professor Oakeshott is that self-governing 
individuality is a developmental outcome, and the stage of government I 
speak of here corresponds to a stage in the development of persons at 
which they are not yet self-governing individuals. Moreover, development 
removes the contradiction Professor Oakeshott identifies between 
government as collective enterprise association and the self-government 
of individuals. Both can without contradiction be predicated of persons 
seriatim, as appropriate to successive stages of development. Finally, 
there is one collective purpose that does not contradict individual self- 
determination, and that is the purpose of securing to all persons the 
necessary preconditions of their individual self-determination. Paramount 
among these are self-knowledge and self-trust. These are the intrinsic 
obligations of the second stage in the development of persons, and the 
purpose of collective enterprise association in the second stage is to  
secure their recognition and fulfillment generally. 
The form, then, of consequent sociality rests upon two prior forms 
of association and government. It is a natural form, but a deveIopmentaI 
outcome that subsists as mere latency in the beginning. 
Turning to the content of consequent sociality, we see that it is none 
other than the virtues, understood, as I have argued, as the expression of 
self-actualized individuality. Ultimately the excellence or perfected in- 
dividuality of every person is unique; it is what the Greeks termed one's 
daimon and the Romans one's genius. The content, then, of consequent 
sociality is the diverse objective excellences of individual associates, and 
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the relationship among them is that of complementarity, not replication. 
What the traditional virtues (honesty, courage, temperance, justice, and 
the rest) represent are the varied manifestations of complementarity in 
significantly different situations when these situations have been grouped 
into classes. In the juridical context, for example, justice is not imposed 
objectively and impersonally by the court, but is expressed in the 
acknowledgment by the litigant who as the person with the lesser claim 
agrees that his claim is the lesser. I t  should be added that so-called 
"adversary proceedings" are inappropriate as the model for conflict- 
resolution in a sociality whose principle is the complementarity of diverse 
excellences. I cannot here undertake to describe the appropriate form, 
but the name for it is "dialectical  proceeding^."'^ 
As the form of consequent sociality is the manifestation of principles 
latent in personhood in prior stages of development, so  the content of 
consequent sociality expresses qualities of personhood that are  
developmental outcomes. I am speaking here not o f  the virt~les o f  self- 
actualization but of the indispensable resources of self-acttlalization. And 
from this point of view, the ratioriale for underpinning consequent 
qociality with prior stages is to secure the development of the personal 
resources by which the terms of  consequent sociality become meaningful 
as opportunities. In the history of moral individualism i t  has been a 
favorite self-indulgence of individualists themselves to lament the fact 
that the vast majority of persons are incapable of the self-responsible 
self-determination moral individuali~m expects. Thus when Niefzsche's 
prophet, Zarathustra, announces that God is dead," he sees by the 
disarray and confusion this produces that the news comes too soon, 
which is to say his hearers are unready for self-determination, and will 
invent new gods to obey. Similarly Oakeshott speaks of persons who, at 
the introduction in the Renaissance of the opportunity of individuality, 
were unready or unwilling to accept it, and traded liberty for sub- 
servience in new guises. He terms such persons individuclls i n ~ n q u i s . ' ~  
One of the problems with moral individualism is the truculent and 
even embittered flavor it quite characteristically has, in consequence of 
heretofore widespread disregard or rejection of the opportunities it holds 
forth. I believe responsibility for this must be laid at the doorstep of 
individualists themselves, for their failure to take development seriously. 
Qualitative individuality is a developmental outcome whose antecedent 
conditions date back almost to birth. It  is because this is so that 
Aristotle was profoundly correct to identify man as zoon politikon, and 
politics as the work of securing these preconditions. Moral individuality 
is not sink or  swim, but first discovering that one floats and then 
venturing a dog-paddle. 
It seems to me that as we stand, the most seriously misjudged and 
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mishandIed stage of life is the stage of adolescence. The responsible 
expression of the search for community, I would urge, is neither to seek 
out those few souls (to put this in Schopenhauerian language) whose 
company we can keep without demeaning ourselves, nor to make God 
our companion and our consolation, as do Kierkegaard and the 
protweneur solitaire of Rousseau. I t  is to work toward a social recon- 
ception of adolescence that understands in it the intrinsic requirement for 
wide exploration of alternative productive activities, life styles, and vital 
choices, in the interest of self-discovery as the precondition of self- 
actualization. 
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